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INTRODUCTION
Self-determination is the right of groups to "determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development."' Although the emergence of new sovereign entities
was not initially a concern of international law, decolonization
necessitated the emergence of new international law in the form of
rules for self-determination.2 Much like there are legal guidelines for
passing domestic statutes in the United States, there are international
legal requirements for resolving self-determination conflicts.3 The
use of legal norms such as earned sovereignty and plebiscites
legalizes the process of recognizing emerging independent states or,
in the alternative, recognizing the sovereign rights attributed to substates.4 Earned sovereignty provides the legal framework for
resolution and addresses international legal status, and the plebiscite
ensures that the framework attains legal status only after popular
consultation of the people.'
The conflict in Kashmir is a fight for self-determination, a
recognized right in international law.6 Until recently, the

1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.l,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/asccpr.htm
(last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
2. See Michael P. Scharf, Intermediate Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings,
31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 7, on file with the
American University International Law Review) (claiming that the codification of
the right to self-determination created the need for applicable international legal

norms).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that the President of the United
States must approve all bills, and if the President chooses to veto the bill, the bill
can only become law if both Houses pass the newly considered bill by a two-thirds
majority vote).
4. See Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, The "Requirement" of Plebiscite in
Territorial Rapprochement, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 23, 34 (1989) (positing that

where plebiscites ensure self-determination, which is a human right, they enjoy the
status of an international legal norm). But see id. at 36-37 (arguing in the latter part
of the article that a plebiscite is not a necessary corollary to self-determination).
5. See infra Part I.B (outlining the basic structures of plebiscites and earned
sovereignty).
6. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (declaring that one of its main purposes of
the United Nations is: "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to
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international legal community had not come up with the legal
framework to reach a solution.7 From the beginning of the Kashmir
conflict, the involved parties argued that the appropriate solution was
a plebiscite, a direct vote whereby the government gives the people
the right to accept or refuse a particular proposal.8 The parties
claimed that a plebiscite' would illustrate the will of the people. The
actions of Pakistan and India, however, have negated any possibility
of self-determination. 9 The international community's attitude
toward the Kashmir plebiscite was to ignore it and retain the status
quo.' ° This attitude has changed as the danger of the situation has

take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."); see also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 1
(confirming the existence of a legal right to self-determination); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 3 (granting the right of self-determination to all people), available at
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-cescr.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003); Halim
Morris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 4 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 204 (1997) (declaring that self-determination has not only
reached the status of customary international law, but also the status of a jus
cogens norm); Sam Blay, Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the PostCommunist Era, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 275 (1994) (noting that selfdetermination is, "an operative legal right in international law and has arguably
acquired the status ofjus cogens.").
7. See infra Part IA and accompanying notes (explaining the history of the
conflict and the present dangers facing the warring parties); see also U.N.
CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (identifying that supporting self-determination is one of the
main purposes of the United Nations); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 1, art. I (upholding the right of self-determination);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, art.
I (granting the right of self-determination to all people); Morris, supra note 6, at
204 (stating that self-determination is not only part of customary international law,
but also is a jus cogens norm); Blay, supra note 6, at 275 (arguing that selfdetermination has attained jus cogens status).
8. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (detailing the promise of a
referendum upon Kashmir's accession to India); see also infra note 45 and
accompanying text (noting the plebiscite order from the U.N. Commission on India
and Pakistan); Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2003) (providing the
definition of the term "plebiscite"), available at http://www.m-w.com/home.htm
(last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
9. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of the
plebiscite order from the U.N. Commission on India and Pakistan).
10. See MOONIS AHMAR, THE PROGRAM IN ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, THE ROAD TO PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA: LESSONS
FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS 28 (1996)
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escalated since India and Pakistan became nuclear powers." Neither
of the parties rules out the use of nuclear weapons, and Pakistan does
not deny the possibility of a first strike. 2 Recent alterations in
regional politics, along with changing worldviews on terrorism, may
soon open the door for a final solution to the Kashmir conflict. 3
However, this solution must be amenable to all of the divergent
groups involved in the conflict. 4 Kashmir is composed of many
cultures fighting for recognition. 5 The regions of "Kashmir" include
Jammu, mostly Hindu; the Kashmir valley, principally Islamic; and
Ladakh, primarily Buddhist. 6 The majority of the Jammu and
Kashmir population resides in Kashmir, which gives the Islamic

(explaining that the nuclear factor is the only factor that motivates involvement by
external
powers),
available
at
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepagedocs/pubsdocs/PDFFiles/Ahmar.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2003).
11. See Fakiha Khan, Note, Nuking Kashmir: Legal Implications of Nuclear
Testing by Pakistan and India in the Context of the Kashmir Dispute, 29 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 361, 367-68 (2001) (recognizing that India's nuclear weapons
program first began in 1974 and became a viable program in May 1998 with
underground testing). Pakistan implied as early as January 1987 that it had a
successful nuclear weapons program. Id. at 369.
12. See
INT'L
CRISIS
GROUP,
KASHMIR:
CONFRONTATION
AND
MISCALCULATION, ASIA REPORT No. 35, at 9 (July 11, 2002) [hereinafter INT'L.
CRISIS GROUP] (describing the nuclear use policies of India and Pakistan in the
Indo-Pak
conflict),
available
at

http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/afghanistan-southasia/reports/A400696_

1

072002.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
13. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (outlining the possible effects
of the October 2002 elections).
14. See PUBLIC INT'L LAW & POLICY GROUP, INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY AS
A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE KosOVo CRISIS, ICG BALKANS REPORT No. 46, Nov.

9, 1998, Foreword [hereinafter BALKANS REPORT No. 46] (preventing further
conflict in the Kosovo crisis required settlement of the claims of all parties
interested),
available
at
http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid = 171 (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).

15. See H.P. Srivastava, Kashmir, COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA (1998) (noting
that Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Buddhists populate Indian-held Kashmir),
available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/colkash.htm (last visited Sept.
12, 2003).
16. See id. (detailing the Jammu and Kashmir region and its religious make-
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population a majority. 7 With this in mind, interested parties must
balance the interests of the three major interest groups when
considering a solution for the Kashmir crisis because each group
contributes to the violence and the nuclear danger. 8
This comment argues for the application of earned sovereignty,
approved by plebiscite, as the best possible legal methodology for an
agreement on the future of Kashmir. 9 The legal structures
established to seek resolutions to the conflicts in Kosovo and East
Timor, earned sovereignty and plebiscites respectively, serve as the
primary basis of analysis.2 0 Rather than considering options for the
final status of Kashmir, this comment focuses on analyzing the best
application of two conflict-ending legal mechanisms by exploring the
benefits and consequences of each mechanism.2 '
Part I discusses the historical background to the conflict in
Kashmir and provides a brief overview of the legal concepts used to

17. See Paul Wiseman, Conflict Has More Than Two Sides, USA TODAY, Jan.
9, 2002, at A4 (providing approximate percentages of religious representation in
Jammu and Kashmir).

18. See India's Secret Army in Kashmir, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, Vol.
8, No. 4, May 1996 (outlining the violence of both the Indian military and the
available at
various
paramilitary
groups
operating
in
Kashmir),
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/kashmir/1996/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
19. See infra Part III (recommending the use of a plebiscite to approve the use
of earned sovereignty as a solution to the conflict).
20. See infra Parts II.A. 1 & II.B. 1 (considering the application of these legal
solutions to the conflicts in East Timor and Kosovo by outlining the benefits and
drawbacks to the use of the solutions in the conflicts).
21.

See

INT'L CRISIS GROUP,

A KosOvo

STATUS, ICG BALKANS REPORT No. 124, ii
ROADMAP] (discussing the necessity of

ROADMAP

(I):

ADDRESSING FINAL

(Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter A Kosovo
the determination of final status),

http://www.intl-crisis(last visited
group.org/projects/europe/kosovo/reports/A400561_01032002.pdf
Sept. 2, 2003). Suggested solutions for Kashmir include partition along ethnic
lines, forcible demographic changes, joint Indo-Pak rule, independence, heightened
autonomy in India, and maintaining the status quo. See MUSHTAQUR RAHMAN,
DIVIDED KASHMIR: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIA, PAKISTAN

AND THE KASHMIRI PEOPLE 161-67 (1996) (discussing the various options for
Kashmir's future status); see also BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at

Executive Summary (affirming that the determination of statehood would still rest
on the international law requirements of (1) territory; (2) population; (3)
government; and (4) capacity to conduct international relations).
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resolve the conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor." The background
highlights significant milestones in the history of the Kashmir region
that led to the present state of conflict." Part I explores the two
primary legal avenues for the groups ending the fight for selfdetermination in Kashmir.24 These include a plebiscite and a newly
emerging theory after Kosovo - earned sovereignty.25 Part III then
recommends that the parties use a plebiscite to approve a contractual
peace agreement legalizing the use of earned sovereignty.26

I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE KASHMIR CONFLICT

1. The Origin of the Conflict
As with most conflicts, the drive for self-determination in Kashmir
finds its roots in history.27 In 1947, the Indian Independence Act
("Independence Act") divided the British ruled state of India into the
independent dominions of India and Pakistan.28 The Independence
Act permitted the leaders of the 565 semi-independent princely states
owned by the British, but controlled by local parties, to choose

22. See infra Part I and accompanying notes (illustrating that Kashmir's violent

history and lack of self-determination play important roles in today's conflict and
discussing the legal definitions of plebiscite and earned sovereignty.).

23. See infra Part L.A (tracing the history, of the conflict back to Kashmir's

initial accession to India in 1947).
24. See infra Parts II.A.I.b & II.A.2.b and accompanying notes (applying the
possible legal theories to Kashmir).

25. See infra Parts II.A.1 & I.B.l and accompanying notes (considering the
application of plebiscites and earned sovereignty in East Timor and Kosovo,
respectively).
26. See infra Part III (explaining that Kashmir has a legal right to a plebiscite
and that earned sovereignty provides a legal solution to the conflict).
27. See infra notes 28-69 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the
Kashmir conflict).
28. See Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 30, § 1 (Eng.)
("two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as
India

and

Pakistan"),

available

at

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/

Congress/4568/memorandum/al 13-204.html (last visited on Sept. 2, 2003).
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independence or accession to either India or Pakistan.29 This included
the state of Jammu and Kashmir.3"
Delay by Kashmir's leader led to Indian accession and the first
promise for a plebiscite.3' Although Kashmir's leader preferred
independence, he chose to wait before making a decision.32 Before he
could make his choice, Pashtun tribesmen invaded the Pakistani
border of Jammu and Kashmir, and Muslim Kashmiris living in the
region joined the invasion, hoping that it would force Kashmir to
accede to Pakistan. 33 Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India
at the time, required Kashmir to accede to India before he would

29. See John Gershman, Overview of Self-Determination Issues in Kashmir,
Foreign Policy in Focus (2001) (stating that there were 565 semi-independent
princely
states
in
1947)
at
http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/kashmirbody.html (last visited Sept. 2,
2003); see also Ali Khan, The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan.for Regional Cooperation,
31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 496 (1994) (explaining that although there were
three legal options for these states, the princely states could not realistically
survive on their own).
30. See Khan, supra note 29, at 496 (noting that a majority of the states joined
either Pakistan or India due mainly to geographic location or religion); see also
Anthony Wanis St. John, The Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute Between
India and Pakistan, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 173, 174 (Winter/Spring 1997).
Although Pakistan did not hold the same view, Prime Minister Nehru of India
insisted that India welcomed all religions. Id.
31. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (detailing the historical delay
by Maharajah Sing and Lord Mountbatten's promise for a plebiscite).
32. See Gershman, supra note 29 (noting that Singh refused to make a decision
for Kashmir). The Maharajah was a descendant of Gulab Singh and leader of
Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. Id.
33. See Edward Luce, Nuclear Threat Fails to Dim Kashmir's Allure, FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 31, 2001, at 5 (stating that the Pashtun troops invaded
Kashmir three months after signature of the Independence Act.) The article states
that Pakistan supported the invasion in its attempt to capture Kashmir for Pakistan.
Id.; see also S.C. Res. 47, U.N. SCOR, 287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/726 (1948)
(securing the withdrawal of Pakistani nationals from Kashmir). The invasion
forced Maharajah Singh to ask the newly independent Indian government for
military aid. See Michael L. Feeley, Note, Apocalvpse Now? Resolving India 's and
Pakistan's Testing Crisis, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 777, 780 (2000)
(noting that Kashmir traded its accession to India for Indian military
reinforcements); see also Luce, supra 33 ("This provided the pretext for Indian
troops to occupy Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and cajole the Maharajah into
signing a treaty of accession to India.").
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agree to aid Kashmir militarily.34 Mountbatten indicated that the
Kashmiri people would later have the opportunity to confirm the
accession.35 Kashmir acceded to India, but the referendum on
accession never occurred.36
2. War Breaks Out Between the Parties

Kashmir's accession to India marked the beginning of the first war
between India and Pakistan.37 Pakistan claimed, and continues to
claim today, that Kashmir's Muslim majority and geographic
proximity make Kashmir rightfully'a part of Pakistan.38 It bases this
belief upon the idea that Pakistan is the one place on the subcontinent
where Muslims could live outside of Hindu rule.39 India, on the other
hand, believed that Kashmir was, and still is, essential to the idea of

34. See St. John, supra note 30, at 175 (confirming that India would only
supply military aid conditioned upon the accession of Kashmir to India). But see
India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, The 1947-48 War, BBC NEWS, (noting the
possibility that Indian forces had already entered Kashmir and therefore Kashmir
at
duress),
under
acceded
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/static/in -depth/south-asia/2002/india-pakistan/ti
meline/default.stm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
35. See Khan, supra note 29, at 509 (quoting Lord Mountbatten's accession
speech).
36. See St. John, supra note 30, at 175 (noting that the plebiscite promised by
Mountbatten never occurred).
37. See Khan, supra note 11, at 364-65 (confirming that the initial invasion had
escalated into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan).
38. See Sumit Ganguly, Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political
Mobilization and Institutional Decay, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 21, no. 2,
Fall 1996 (affirming that Kashmir's Muslim-majority and geographic location are
available
at
right),
claim
of
Pakistan's
basis
for
the
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sumit.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
39. See Somini Sengupta, The India-Pakistan Tension: The Background;
Strugglefor Kashmir is Fueled by ClashingNational Narratives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2002, p. 12 (noting the reason for the British creation of Pakistan). "As
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the foreign minister and later the president of Pakistan,
declared in 1964, 'Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full
meaning."' Id.
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Indian secularism. 40 The war over Kashmir's accession began in
1947 based on these two opposing views. 4'
Almost immediately after the beginning of the war, however, the
two countries sought help from the United Nations ("U.N.") Security
Council. 42 The United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan
("UNCIP") ordered the first ceasefire, which took effect in January
1949.43 The UNCIP resolution ordering the ceasefire also ordered the
parties to determine the future of Kashmir "inaccordance with the

40. See id. (claiming that Indians see Kashmir as the "mantle" to their "secular,
multiethnic democracy").
41. See Craig Whitlock, Even Patriots Grow Weary Over Kashmir, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 2002, at A16 (explaining that the war was fought on these two
principles).
42. See S.C. Res. 38, U.N. SCOR, 229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/651 (Jan. 17, 1948)
(illustrating that both India and Pakistan registered complaints with the U.N.
Security Council as early as January 1948); see also S.C. Res. 39, U.N. SCOR,
230th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/654 (Jan. 20, 1948) (establishing a Security Council
Commission in Kashmir); S.C. Res. 47, U.N. SCOR, 287th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/726
(April 21, 1948) (enlarging the Commission from three members to five). The five
members of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan were (1) Argentina
(nominated by Pakistan), (2) Czechoslovakia (nominated by India), (3) United
States of America (nominated by President of the Security Council), (4) Belgium,
and (5) Colombia (the Council nominated both Belgium and Columbia as required
by Resolution 51). Id. The Commission's mandate was to investigate issues under
Article 34 of the U.N. Charter as well as assess mediation possibilities. Id. Article
34 of the U.N. Charter states, "The Security Council may investigate any dispute,
or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute,
in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art.
34.
43. See U.N. SCOR, U.N. Comm. for India and Pakistan, U.N. Doc. S/1100,
75 (Nov. 9, 1948) [hereinafter UNCIP S/I100] (detailing the cease-fire order
issued by the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan), available at
http://www.un.int/pakistan/15480813.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003). The ceasefire and truce were to begin "as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be
mutually agreed upon." Id. Part I, § A. The U.N. Commission for India and
Pakistan also created the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
("NMOGIP") in January 1949 to supervise the ceasefire. See U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Comm. for India and Pakistan, U.N. Doc. S/1196, 15 (Jan. 10, 1949) [hereinafter
UNCIP S/1196] (setting the date for the cease-fire because the two parties were
unable
to
reach
an
agreement),
available
at
http://www.un.int/pakistan/15490105.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
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will of the people." 44 Most importantly, the Commission ordered a
plebiscite at the request of both India and Pakistan. 45 Notably, the
United Nations conditioned any plebiscite on the withdrawal of
46
Indian and Pakistani forces from Kashmir.
Disagreements between India and Pakistan resulted in two
additional wars and two additional agreements. 47 The parties agreed
to solve the Kashmir issue through peaceful means in the Tashkent

Agreement, which ended the 1965 war. 41 The Simla Agreement,
ending the 1971 war over Bangladesh, specified that the parties
would determine the future of Kashmir at a later date.4 9 To this day,

Pakistan argues that India ignored the U.N. resolution calling for a
plebiscite. India retorts that Pakistan never withdrew its forces from
Kashmir pursuant to the resolution requirements and that the Simla

44. See UNCIP S/i100, supra note 43 (detailing the requirement of a
ceasefire); see also AHMAR, supra note 10, at 40 (observing that, at one time, both
India and Pakistan supported a plebiscite for Kashmir). India later changed its
position and now considers Kashmir to be an integral part of India. Id.
45. See UNCIP S/726, supra note 43, pmbl. (noting that India and Pakistan
reaffirmed their hope for a plebiscite).
46. See UNCIP S/i 196, supra note 43, § 2 (stating that the plebiscite will not
be held until the cease-fire is met).
47. See Whitlock, supra note 41 (noting that India and Pakistan have fought
three wars, in 1945, 1965, and 1971).
48. See India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, The 1965 War, BBC NEWS
ONLINE (outlining the cause of the 1965 war and its pacific settlement at
Tashkent),
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in-depth/south-asia/2002/india-pakistan/ti
meline/1965.stm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003).
49. See The Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972, India-Pak., 858 U.N.T.S. 71, 73
(stating that the two parties will meet at a future date to discuss the final settlement
of
Jammu
and
Kashmir),
available
at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Kashmir/shimla.htm (last visited Sept. 4,
2003).
50. See Sengupta, supra note 39 (proclaiming that the non-occurrence of a
plebiscite is, "the mantra for Pakistani outrage against India").
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agreement negated the 1949 UNCIP resolution." The result was that
the parties again frustrated a plebiscite.52
3. The CurrentInsurgency
In the late 1980s, the fight over Jammu and Kashmir took a turn
for the worse. 3 India controlled two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir
while Pakistan controlled one-third of the region, presently known as
Azad, or "Free," Kashmir. 4 At the same time, trust in the Kashmir
political process deteriorated. 5 The Indian government consistently
dismissed Kashmir leaders who did not agree with the Indian
agenda. 6 Popular groups routinely accused the state's ruling party,
51. See MUSHTAQUR RAHMAN, DIVIDED KASHMIR: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW
OPPORTUNITIES

FOR INDIA, PAKISTAN

AND THE KASHMIRI PEOPLE

162 (1996)

(noting India's position on the plebiscite after the Simla Agreement).

52. See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES,
REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS 126 (1994) (discussing the non-occurrence
of the U.N. sponsored plebiscite for Kashmir).
53. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (noting the beginning of the
present-day insurgency).
54. See Gershman, supra note 29 (detailing the division of Jammu and Kashmir
between India and Pakistan after the 1947 war). During the war, Pakistan seized
northwestern Kashmir. See Sengupta, supra note 39 (describing the area seized by
Pakistan in the 1947 war). The dividing line between the two regions is the "Line
of Control". See Michael Fathers, Play Nice, TIME, Feb. 5, 2001, at 18 (noting that
the Simla Agreement established the Line of Control as the informal border
between India and Pakistan; see also The Simla Agreement, supra note 49, at 73
("[Tlhe line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be
");Charles Sanctuary, Analysis: Contentious Line of
respected by both sides ....
Control, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 2002 (confirming that the Line of Control basically
at
war),
1947
the
of
end
the
at
frontline
the
matches
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/south asia/377916.stm (last visited Sept. 3,
2003). The Line of Control became the flash point for many cross-border
incursions and a constant build of troops. See INT'L. CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12,
at I (detailing the history of the Line of Control).
55. See Wiseman, supra note 17 (affirming the belief that local elections were
"rigged"); see also Sanjoy Majumder, A New Era in Kashmiri Politics, BBC
NEWS, Oct. 11, 2002 (quoting Shujaat Bukhari, a local journalist, "[t]he fact is that
many do believe that [the October 2002 election] has been one of the fairest
at
history."),
Kashmiri
in
elections
(last visited Sept. 3,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south-asia/2320605.stm
2003).

56. See Jammu and Kashmir Backgrounder, SOUTH ASIA
(2001)

[hereinafter Backgrounder] (explaining that the

TERRORISM PORTAL

central

government
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the National Conference ("NC"), of widespread corruption.57 The
1987 election fraud cemented this belief.58 Seizing the opportunity,
Pakistan began supporting newly emerging Kashmiri and nonKashmiri paramilitary groups fighting for accession to Pakistan. 9
The rise of these paramilitary groups began the present insurgency in
Kashmir.6 °

The end of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan
occurred in 1999.61 The Kargil crisis, resulting from the 1999
meeting between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian
Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, increased the intensity of violence in
Kashmir. 62 Unfortunately, the confidence-building measures
considered at the meeting never took effect because Pakistan's Chief
of Army Staff, General, and future President, Pervez Musharraf, sent
dismissed Farooq Abdullah's government in 1984 and Ghulam Mohammad Shar's
government,
the
successor
of
Abdullah,
in
1986),
at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/backgrounder
/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003). The Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi,
then swore in Farooq Abdullah as the new Chief Minister of Kashmir after the
1987 election. Id. Abdullah won the election with Gandhi's support and agreement.
Id.
57. See Gershman, supra note 29 (discussing the public view of the National
Conference party).
58. See id. (outlining the outcome and effect of the 1987 elections). A new
political party had emerged that represented a wide base of Kashmiri Muslims,
including both pro-independence and pro-Pakistan supporters. Id. The party, titled
the Muslim United Front ("MUF"), was the favorite to win the election. Id.
Muslim Kashmiris believed that the loss of the election to the NC, and the
reelection of Farooq Abdullah, was the result of obvious fraud. Id.
59. See Sengupta, supra note 39 (affirming that out of 2,400 militants in
Kashmir today, 1,400 are non-Kashmiris and the two deadliest groups operate out
of Pakistan); see also Backgrounder, supra note 56 (noting that Pakistan used
"civilian discontent" to begin the insurgency).
60. See Backgrounder, supra note 56 (noting that the insurgency began in
Kashmir with the explosion of two bombs in Srinigar by the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front on July 31, 1988).
61. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (outlining the effect of the
Kargil crisis on Indo-Pakistani relations).
62. See INT'L. CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12, at 2 ("The current situation can
best be seen as a continuation of the hostilities that have marked India-Pakistan
relations since the Kargil crisis."). The purpose of the meeting was to create
"confidence-building measures," and at the end of the meeting, Pakistan consented
to overlook the U.N. resolution calling for a plebiscite as long as India would cease
to refer to Kashmir as "an integral part of India." Id. at 1.
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Pakistani troops into the Kashmir region of Kargil, and India
responded with troops of its own.63 Later that year, Musharraf staged
a coup in Pakistan and assumed power.' India responded by
significantly reducing diplomatic relations with Pakistan." After a
December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, India withdrew its
ambassador from Pakistan.66 This was the end of official diplomatic
relations between the two countries.67 Fortunately, both sides
continue to attempt confidence-building measures such as those

63. See id. (recounting Pervez Musharraf's infiltration of two sectors of Jammu
and Kashmir; Kargil and Drass). The ten-week war resulted in over 1,000
casualties. See Sengupta, supra note 39 (estimating the total casualties from the
Kargil war).
64. See Gregory R. Copley, Pakistan Under Musharraf,DEF. & FOREIGN AFF.
STRATEGIC POL'Y, Jan. 2000 (detailing Musharraf's "almost inevitable" coup,
which ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif). "As soon as Gen. Musharraf was
given the post of [Army Chief of Staff], his close acquaintances noted that it would
only be a matter of time before Gen. Musharraf... became intolerant of the Naza
Administration's lack of planning and its failure to stay focu[s]ed." Id.; see also
Barry Bearak, For the Newest Nuclear Powers, a Little Chat, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2001, § 4, p. 5 (confirming Musharraf's overthrow of Prime Minister Sharif in
October 1999).
65. See INT'L. CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12, at 2 (indicating the deterioration
of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan).
66. See id. (providing an explanation for India's withdrawal of its ambassador
from Pakistan). India accused two Pakistan-based paramilitary groups, Jaish-iMohammad and Lashkar-i-Taiba, of attacking the Parliament. Id. See generally
Wiseman, supra note 17 (discussing terrorist attacks and history of Kashmir
insurgency).
67. See INT'L. CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12, at 2 (relaying the fallout of
December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament). Although Pakistan immediately
countered India's movement of troops to the Line of Control, President Musharraf
publicly denounced the attack and banned five different Islamic extremist groups,
including the two groups suspected of committing the attack. Id. Musharraf
ordered the offices of the five groups sealed and arrested 2,000 Islamic extremists.
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proposed at Kargil.68 Unfortunately, the efforts have not been entirely
successful.6 9
4. A New Beginning

Just as scholars believe that the 1987 election was the flash point
of the present insurgency, many Kashmiris believe that the elections
of October 2002 may represent the beginning of new hope for
Kashmir. 7° The six-year tenure of the Kashmiri state assembly ended
in 2002. 71 The resulting election brought the defeat of the NC, the
party of the Abdullah family that had dominated the corrupt political
scene in Kashmir for over fifty years. 72 Kashmiris saw the election as
a step towards peace because they had overcome the fraudulent
elections of the past.73 In fact, the new Kashmir government is
already making important moves toward peace. 4

68. See Timeline: Conflict Over Kashmir, CNN.coM, May 24, 2002 (detailing
the attempts by all sides of the conflict at peace talks, troop withdrawal and cease
at
fires),
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/24/kashmir.timeline/index.htm
I (last visited Sept. 3, 2003); see also AHMAR, supra note 10, at 46, Table 12
(listing confidence building measures between India and Pakistan from July 1972
and 1992).
69. See Timeline: Conflict Over Kashmir, supra note 68 (emphasizing the
continuous actions of the Indian government, the Pakistani government, and
paramilitaries after peace overtures); see also AHMAR, supra note 10, at 33
(confirming that for every two steps made towards peace, there are four steps away
from peace).
70. See Majumder, supra note 55 (noting that Kashmiri citizens are accepting
the results of the October 2002 election "with wonder, enthusiasm and even a faint
sense of optimist about the future of this disputed state ... "). But see AHMAR,
supra note 10, at 30 (positing that post-election posturing in India or Pakistan
could lead at best to confidence building measures). It is unlikely that this
"posturing" will lead to any kind of substantive solution. Id.
71. See Rajyasri Rao, Q&A: Kashmir Assembly Elections, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23,
2002 (explaining the backdrop of the recent elections in Kashmir), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/2249016.stm (last visited Sept. 3,
2003).
72. See Majumder, supra note 55 (specifying that the election brought about
the defeat of Omar Abdullah, the ruler of the NC); see also Ashok Sharma, Indian
Parties Try to Form Coalition in Kashmir, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at A26
(explaining the significance of the recent elections).
73. See Majumder, supra note 55 (quoting a local journalist's response to the
recent elections as being "one of the fairest elections in Kashmiri history."). All of
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The constant atmosphere of death, torture, and a withering
economy, along with the present postures of the leaders of both India

the parties in the election were pro-India. Id. The Islamic militant groups fighting
for independence or accession to Pakistan, including the All-Party Hurriyat
Conference, boycotted the election and threatened voters, as they have for years.
See Rao, supra note 71 ("They believe that the only vote that counts is a plebiscite
to decide whether Kashmir is to remain part of India or not."). Regardless of the
threats of violence, there was a forty-six percent voting percentage rate. Id. India
claims that such a high rate of participation confirms that people are still willing to
be a part of the democratic process of India. Id.
74. See Alex Perry, Peace in the Balance, TIME, Dec. 16, 2002, at 84
(describing the coalition administration created by the Congress Party and the
People's Democratic Party). The People's Democratic Party ("PDP"), led by Mufti
Mohammed Sayeed, agreed to form a coalition government with the Congress
party, India's main opposition party, and with two smaller parties, the People's
Democratic Front and the Panthers Party. Id. The parties announced several goals
in their "Common Minimum Programme" ("CMP"). See Interview on
Doordarshan Television, with New Delhi of the Congress party, the People's
Democratic Party, People's Democratic Front, and Panthers Party, Programme of
New Kashmir Coalition Government Issued, BBC MONITORING S. ASIA, Oct. 27,
2002 (outlining the commitments made in the CMP by all members of the coalition
government). Ensuring development of all three regions of Kashmir, removing
poverty, and the restoration of "peace and normalcy" were three of the items on the
CMP. Id. The coalition believes that its victory is the result of Kashmir's vote for
peace. See Shujaat Bukhari, Talks Soon with Elected Representatives, Others in
J&K, THE HINDU, Dec. 28, 2002 (recalling Chief Minister Sayeed's belief that the
Kashmiri people voted for peace in the October 2002 election). One of the pledges
of the PDP was to hold talks with all sides of the conflict, including pro-Pakistan
groups. See Edward Luce, Kashmir's New Leader Frees SeparatistPolitician, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at 4 (noting the important electoral pledge made by the
incoming government). A senior member of the coalition stated, "Mufti Sayeed
wants to open a new chapter in the Kashmir dispute by persuading militant groups
that it is worthwhile talking." Id. As a show of faith, Chief Minister Sayeed freed
Yassin Malik, a leading separatist and leader of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation
Front, from detention less than one month after the election. Id. The Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front played a central role in creating the insurgency after the
1987 election. Id. By December 2002, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister, L. K.
Advani, agreed to hold a dialogue with not only elected representatives but also
with those parties that did not choose to participate in the 2002 election, namely
paramilitary forces. See Bukhari, supra note 74 (outlining statements made by both
Deputy Prime Minister Advani and Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Sayeed
regarding the proposed dialogue). But see Victoria Burnett, Prayersfor Peace at
Pakistan Border, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2002, at A6 (noting Deputy Prime
Minister's Advani's challenge to Pakistan to "face India in out-and-out war instead
of what he called a proxy war through extremist groups in Kashmir").
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and Pakistan, may lead to the possibility of peace.75 Reports from
Kashmir indicate that Kashmiri citizens are growing weary of
fighting and being fought over.76 It is becoming clear that this is not
Kashmir's war, but Kashmiris are being made to suffer the
consequences." Furthermore, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and
Pakistani President Musharraf may be the first two leaders of their
respective countries who could bring peace."
B. LEGAL STRUCTURES FOR RESOLVING SELF-DETERMINATION
CONFLICTS

The proper way to ensure that the Kashmir people can freely
pursue their right to self-determination is to make legal proposals for
conflict resolution.7 9 Plebiscites and earned sovereignty provide both
the popular consultation of the will of the people and a legal method
by which all three parties to the conflict can compromise.8" This
results in the establishment of an intermediate legal status for
Kashmir that assures the exercise of self-determination by requiring
a plebiscite.8
75. Compare Backgrounder, supra note 56 (claiming that 26,226 people were
killed between 1988 and 2000), with Gershman, supra note 29 (noting that the
reports of casualties range from 35,000 to 70,000).
76. See Whitlock, supra note 41 (commenting on the changing attitudes of
individuals in Kashmir towards the war).
77. See id. (quoting a Kashmiri citizen, "[w]e are very patriotic about Kashmir,
but this is not our war. It is a war between two countries. Neither the Indian army
nor the Pakistani army are good for us.").
78. See Fathers, supra note 54 (explaining the two different postures of the
leaders, their present initiatives for peace, and their power to bring about change).
Not only is Prime Minister Vajpayee one of India's most respected and popular
politicians, but he has the backing of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu rightwing party. Id. "If anyone has the credibility to sell Indian Hindus a compromise
with both Muslim Pakistan and the predominantly Muslim Kashmiris, it is
Vajpayee." Id. President Musharraf, on the other hand, is in a tougher position
because he is attempting to restore the international reputation of Pakistan as well
as its internal stability. Id.
79. See Blay, supra note 6, at 275 (confirming that self-determination is a legal
concept).
80. See AHMAR supra note 10, at 30 (reinforcing the idea that all parties must
compromise in this situation).
81. See infra Part III (proposing recommendations for ending the violence
including a plebiscite approving any peace agreement).
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1. Plebiscitesor Referendums
Self-determination by its definition requires a free choice by the
people regarding their domestic or international future.82 Plebiscites,
or referendums, are the legal mechanisms most widely used to ensure
self-determination. 3 A plebiscite can function as more than a vote on
independence.84 Plebiscites can also function as a general
consultation of the people's will regarding a particular proposal.85
There are two forms of plebiscites: internal and international. 86
Internal, or domestic, plebiscites use popular consultation to approve
constitutional amendments or other internal changes to the country's
legal structure.87 They are part of the inherent rights of an individual
as a citizen of that country.88 International plebiscites, on the other
hand, are generally the result of international instruments, such as
peace agreements or treaties, which lay the framework for the
proposed vote. 9 Absent an international instrument, the international

82. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 52, at 18 (explaining the implication of popular
consultation within the definition of self-determination). "Both external and
internal self-determination imply a democratic process, i.e. a free and clear choice
by the population of the territory or country through a plebiscite, referendum or
through elections." Id.
83. See Eric Ting-lun Huang, The Evolution of the Concept of SelfDetermination and the Right of the People of Taiwan to Self-Determination, 14
N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 167, 194 (2001) (stressing the importance of determining the
will of the people); see also Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, The Kashmir Dispute: Solution
Through Plebiscite,Kashmiri American Council (1997) (noting the necessity of an
at
available
dispute),
the
to
end
vote
impartial
http://www.geocities.com/indianfas/kashmir/solution.htm (last visited Sept. 3,
2003).
84. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 52, at 19 (stating that the definition of an
international plebiscite is "the consultation of a people by means of a vote as to its
wishes on an importantpublic question.") (emphasis added).
85. See id. at 33 (discussing the difference between international plebiscites
and local elections).
86. See id. at 19 (explaining that there are important distinctions between
international and internal plebiscites).
87. See id. (confirming the definition of an internal plebiscite).
88. See id. (noting the "rights" of national democratic populations).
89. See id. (defining possible references to an "international plebiscite").
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plebiscite generally occurs when the future status of a territory in the
international community is at stake. 9°
Plebiscites function as a legally enacted choice between options. 91
An international plebiscite requires monitoring in order to confirm
that there is no tampering with the results by government leaders or
threats to those participating.92 There are many different methods of
monitoring. 93 In bilateral plebiscites, where there is no specific
international intervention, the country's authorities may authorize
international observers to certify the fairness of the vote.94 In
multilateral plebiscites, the state's government authorizes monitoring
by intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs") such as the United
Nations or the Organization of American States. 95 The organizations
will then report on the fairness and objectivity of the election or
plebiscite. 96
2. EarnedSovereignty: A Possible Solution
The international legal community recognizes that inherent
difficulties exist with the term "sovereignty." 97 Traditionally,
90. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 52, at 19 id. (detailing a possible objective of
an international plebiscite).
91. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining what is meant by the
term "plebiscite").
92. See Huang, supra note 83, at 194 (emphasizing that election observer
missions are typically used to ensure (1) proper registration of voters and inability
to tamper with voting lists; (2) the ability to freely exercise the right to vote and
free and fair counting of the votes; and (3) the free flow of information to the
voters during the campaign).
93. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 52, at 34 (discussing the various forms of
election monitoring).
94. See id. (detailing those instances where bilateral monitoring occurs).
95. See id. (explaining who performs multilateral plebiscite monitoring). Most
of the leaders of the IGOs are themselves subject to reelection, so it is important to
use individuals renowned for their independence and competence. Id.
96. See id. at 34-35 (noting the general objectives of an international
monitoring presence, including assurances of legitimacy).
97. See Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After
Kosovo: Translating Self-Determination "into Practice" and "into Peace ", 6
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 455, 465 (2000) (stating that redefining sovereignty will
be "the defining issue in international law for the 21st century"); see also HURST
HANNUM,

AUTONOMY,

SOVEREIGNTY,

AND

SELF-DETERMINATION:

THE
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sovereignty is defined as independence, and, until recently, that
definition has remained stringent.98 Either a region is sovereign and
independent, or it is not, and, therefore, has no sovereign rights. 99
Problems arise when solutions to conflicts cannot turn on such a
black-or-white distinction. 'w
The cultural conflicts of the past fifty years have led to an
expansion of the term sovereignty.' 0 Unfortunately, the propensity
of international lawyers to adhere to the strict stigma of the term
"sovereignty" remains. 10 2 Thus, in conflict negotiations the parties
often have a difficult time understanding that different levels of
sovereignty can be gained at varying phases - not necessarily ever
leading to total independence or statehood." 3 Often parties will walk

14-15 (1992) (discussing the conflict
in the defining the term sovereignty and the implications of the definition).
98. See id. at 15 (stating that sovereignty is usually defined as, "the
fundamental authority of a state to exercise its powers without being subservient to
any outside authority"); see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, ProblematicSovereignty,
in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 1, 6 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) [hereinafter
ProblematicSovereignty] ("Some of the confusion that has been associated with
the concept of sovereignty can be dispelled if it is recognized that the different
rules and characteristics that have been associated with sovereignty do not
necessarily go together. They can be unbundled."); STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS

SOVEREIGNTY:

ORGANIZED

HYPOCRISY

220 (1999)

[hereinafter

ORGANIZED

(stating that international legal sovereignty refers to the rights of
countries that have legal independence).
99. See HANNUM, supra note 97, at 15 (noting the absolute quality that some
writers give to the term "sovereignty").
100. See BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at 17-20 (stating that Kosovo
was entitled to self-determination and the right to attain international status, but
citing the need to preserve territorial integrity as the basis for using intermediate,
or earned, sovereignty in Kosovo); see also Graham, supra note 97, at 458
(supporting the idea of pooling the principles of sovereignty and autonomy in order
to create a new environment for resolving self-determination conflicts).
101. See HANNUM, supra note 97, at 26 (welcoming the new, fluid concept of
sovereignty).
102. See Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 2) (noting that international lawyers
tend to adhere to the traditionally accepted definition of sovereignty).
103. See Interview with Paul Williams, Ph.D., Professor of Law and
International Relations, American University Washington College of Law,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 3, 2003) (discussing Professor Williams' negotiation
experiences and views on earned sovereignty).
HYPOCRISY]

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[19:153

away from negotiations simply because they cannot get past the use
04
of the term sovereignty.1
Sovereignty is now evolving into a set of powers that may be
given and refused. 10 5 Although the conventional legal rules of
sovereignty generally control, innovative solutions are emerging as
an appropriate substitute in certain situations. 0 6 A new theory,
attaining "legal sanctification," is arising to fit the need - "earned
sovereignty."' 7 Although rooted in sources of international law such
as scholarly writings and general principles, thus far the international
community has applied newly emerging theories such as earned
sovereignty only in peace agreements and has not yet made such
theories the subject of treaties or customary international law. 08

104. See Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 2-3) (observing that the inability to
see beyond the legally accepted definition of sovereignty may have been at the root
of many conflicts, such as Bosnia); see also Interview with Paul Williams, supra
note 103 (noting the trouble caused by an inability to negotiate outside of the terms
"independence" or "sovereignty").
105. See ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY, supra note 98, at 220 n.1 (referring to
sovereignty as a bundle of properties and attributes).
106. See ProblematicSovereignty, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that in the face of
conflict, traditional legal boundaries of sovereignty may be broken); see also
Graham, supra note 97, at 457 (quoting U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott: "While self-determination at Versailles meant 'the dismant[ling] of
empire[s] and the formation of a whole new cluster of nation-states,"' the Balkans
of today require 'new answers to those old questions about nationhood, statehood,
democracy, and self-determination."').
107. See Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3) ("Conversely, where diplomats
have experimented with new conceptions of sovereignty without legal
sanctification, the rule of law and role of international lawyers in the policy

making process have suffered."). But cf

INDEPENDENT INT'L COMMISSION ON
Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS
LEARNED 271-79 (2000) [hereinafter THE Kosovo REPORT] (describing earned

independence but using the term "conditional independence").

108. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-56 (7th rev. ed. 1997) (outlining the requirements which
must be met before a legal standard considered customary international law, and
providing an overview of additional sources of international law); see also Statute
of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 38, 59, Stats. 1055, 1060
(listing the four sources of international law applied in decisions of the
International Court of Justice decisions), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasic statute.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2003).
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Earned sovereignty requires an initial grant of sovereignty rights
and allows future grants of power to be conditioned upon the ability
of the sub-state's citizens to meet certain standards.'0 9 The creation
of "earned sovereignty" achieves two goals."' It allows the
international legal community to address other creative forms of
conflict resolution without the "sovereignty" stigma by creating a
new intermediate legal status, and it begets better negotiations
because parties are willing to listen to what the sub-state may "earn"
and what the "price" may be. "
Earned sovereignty, as a legally accepted form of resolution,
allows the parties to agree on basic requirements that the emerging
state must meet before the parent state will grant various sovereign
powers, such as the right to govern and sign international
instruments." 2 It is also a formula for progressive devolution of

109. See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the
Conflict over Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (forthcoming
2003) (manuscript at 2, on file with the American University International Law
Review) (providing an overview of the basic premise of earned sovereignty).

110. See INDEPENDENT INT'L COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE FOLLOW-UP OF
(2001) (on file with

THE Kosovo REPORT: WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE? 25

the American University International Law Review) [hereinafter WHY
CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?] (defining conditional independence); see also
Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (outlining the major premises behind
earned sovereignty).
11. See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Peace by Other Means: Using Rewards in UN
Efforts to End Conflicts, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235, 250 (1998) (affirming
the principle of earned sovereignty by noting that if a state were to condition its
cessation of hostilities on the ability of the other party to meet certain conditions,
that party would likely meet those conditions if it were presently being subjected to
extended hostilities). As an example, Amley provides the following:
A's offer to stop tipping the boat if B will row is unlikely to be perceived by
B as a carrot unless A actually is tipping the boat at the time the offer is made.
A tips the boat in order to shift B's expectation baseline, so that B will
perceive the offer to stop tipping the boat as a reward.
Id.; see also Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (noting that, based on
his own negotiations experience, earned sovereignty enables compromise).
112. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 25 (discussing
the basic theory behind conditional independence); see also THOMAS C. HELLER &
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, Sovereignty: The Practitioners' Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 24, 26-27 (listing the various sovereignty rights and
obligations which come with recognized sovereignty, including: (1) the right to
territorial integrity; (2) the right to defend the state through the use of force; (3) the
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power."'3 The concept allows for greater negotiation power regarding
democratic principles and the protection of human rights, because the
sub-state is able to obtain sovereign powers while promising to
protect democracy and human rights." 4 The end goal of earned
sovereignty, or conditional independence, is to put political
5
responsibility back in the hands of the people.' 1
Earned

sovereignty contains five key elements:

(1) shared

sovereign authority of state and sub-state functions; (2) attainment of
de facto and de jure levels of sovereign authority; (3) increasing, or
decreasing, levels of sovereignty over time as the specified

conditions are met; (4) internationally supervised or mediated
resolution of final status; and (5) possible international recognition
6
conditioned on the ability to meet continuing limitations."
The theory of earned sovereignty is still relatively new in
international legal theory, but the international community has
already supported its use in various proposals for Kosovo."' The
United Nations Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") supported the use of
earned sovereignty when it laid out its "standards before status"
approach." 8 The two central statements of the approach were that a
right to govern by establishing, applying and enforcing law; (4) eligibility for
membership in international organizations; (5) the capacity to act as a legal entity
for owning, purchasing, transferring property, etc.; (6) grant of sovereign immunity
for noncommercial activities and consular relations; (7) capacity to sign
agreements; (8) the duty to respect the territorial integrity of other sovereign
nations; and (9) the obligation to abide by international law).
113. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 28-29
(providing a general overview of the different processes of conditional
independence).
114. See Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at 2) (noting the benefits of
earned sovereignty).
115. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 28 (discussing
that conditional independence is not only a process, but also an end goal).
116. See Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at 2) (establishing the five basic
elements of earned sovereignty).
117. See BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at I (proposing earned
sovereignty as a legal option for Kosovo); see also WHY CONDITIONAL
INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 28 (supporting the use of conditional
independence for the determination of Kosovo's future status).
118. See Press Release, United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Address to the
Security Council by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, UNMIK/PR/792 (July 30, 2002) [hereinafter UNMIK/PR/792]
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return to Serbian control was not in Kosovo's future, and that
UNMIK would establish a set of "benchmarks"
institutions must meet.' 9

that Kosovar

II. ANALYSIS
The international legal community continually fights for
preservation of territorial integrity, which, in turn, necessitates a
denial of secession.120 Where a self-identified group of people with a
territorial connection repeatedly is denied the right to exercise selfdetermination and can articulate a legitimate basis for its secession,
however, the group may legally be entitled to self-determination. 2 ' If
that group is systematically refused basic human rights and access to
the democratic process, that group may legally be entitled to
secession and international recognition.'2 2 According to these
(emphasizing the importance of the U.N. Mission in Kosovo's message that
Kosovo must reach the standards demanded by its people and the international
community before the parties can reach any determination regarding its future
status), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr792.htm (last
visited Sept. 6, 2003).
119. See id. (describing what Kosovo will not be in the future, as well as setting
benchmarks for attainment of future sovereignty); see also Williams, supra note
109 (manuscript at 2) (establishing the five basic requirements of earned
sovereignty).
120. See G.A. Res. 15414, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1961) [hereinafter Res. 15414] (declaring the incompatibility of the
disruption of territorial integrity with the principles of the U.N. Charter); see also
Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 479, 508 (1994) (explaining that the protection of territorial integrity
conflicts with the right to secede, and arguing that this impedes the ability of
secession to gain the status of customary international law); BALKANS REPORT No.
46, supra note 14, at 8 (highlighting the attitude of the international community's
attitude towards secession and self-determination).
121. See BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at 8-9 (noting that there are
circumstances in which secession may be appropriate); see also Eric Kolodner, The
Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 153, 160 (1994)
(confirming that scenarios exist where the only available method of protecting the
rights of a people is secession). Kolodner argues, however, that the right to selfdetermination does not necessarily grant the right to secede. Id. If this were the
case, the international system would become "fragmented, politically unstable,
incapable of addressing global problems, and economically unfit to provide the
necessities of life to many of the world's inhabitants." Id.
122. See Haile, supra note 120, at 508 (confirming that secession may be
appropriate where there are serious violations of human rights); see also BALKANS
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guidelines, Kashmir is entitled to international recognition and
secession. 23
The conflict in Kashmir, at its simplest level, is essentially a subentity of a state fighting to determine its future status.'2 4 As in
Kashmir, the people of East Timor and Kosovo fought for selfdetermination amidst larger conflicts between two nations.'25 Not
only were the people in East Timor and Kosovo fighting for the right
to self-determination, but also, as in Kashmir, they were fighting for
the protection of human rights.'26 The conflicts in East Timor'27 and

No. 46, supra note 14, at 2 (outlining the basic legal requirements for selfdetermination and international recognition).
123. See supra Part L.A (affirming the historical denial of human rights and
access to democratic institutions experienced by Kashmir).
REPORT

124. See supra Section I.A.1 (presenting the origin of the Kashmir conflict).
125. See infra notes 127-128 (noting that the East Timorese were the subject of
a battle between Portugal and Indonesia and that the Albanians and Serbs fought
over the Kosovars).
126. See id. (detailing the conflicts in East Timor and Kosovo as essentially
responses to egregious human rights abuses).
127. See IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE BALLOT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

15 (2001) (outlining

the history of the fight between Portugal and Indonesia's over East Timor).
Portugal considered East Timor to be a province until 1975, when it recognized
East Timor's right to self-determination. Id. The Portuguese never implemented
their plan for transition due to the breakout of civil war in East Timor. See Tania
Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian
Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 31, 52 (2002) (discussing the Indonesian Army's invasion of East
Timor in December 1975). Indonesia then annexed East Timor as an Indonesian
province. Id. Neither Portugal nor the Fretilin, the prominent independence
political group in East Timor, accepted the incorporation. Id. at 52-53. The East
Timorese resistance campaign, coupled with a brutal Indonesian counterinsurgency force, resulted in the death of 200,000 East Timorese people. See
Anthony L. Smith, East Timor (noting that 200,000 individuals were killed out of a
pre-invasion
population
estimate
of
800,000),
at
http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/timor body.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2003). While some states accepted the Indonesian annexation of East Timor, most
of the international community scorned Indonesia for clearly violating
international law. Id. East Timor continued an unsuccessful fight for independence
against Indonesian President Suharto until his resignation in 1998. Id. Suharto's
successor, B.J. Habibie, succeeded in proposing a new plan for resolving the East
Timor situation. Id.
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Kosovo"' are comparable to Kashmir in this respect, and the legal
framework applied in each case may provide similarly applicable
solutions for Kashmir.
A. PLEBISCITES AND REFERENDUMS

1. The Plebiscite:East Timor Successes and Failures
The purpose of a plebiscite is to function as a legally binding
dispute resolution through democratic means.2 9 The U.N. SecretaryGeneral's involvement as moderator of the East Timor plebiscite
confirms the United Nations' acceptance of plebiscites as legal
solutions to self-determination conflicts. 30 The Secretary-General
not only approved of the plebiscite, but he also acted as a signatory
to the Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular

128. See BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at 4-7 (providing an overview
of the Balkans' history prior to the crisis in Kosovo). After World War II, the new
Yugoslav constitution provided that Kosovo would be an Autonomous Province
within the Republic of Serbia. Id. at 4-5. Over the years, Serbia granted Kosovo
additional rights of self-rule. Id. at 5. This changed abruptly after Tito's death,
however. Id. The Kosovar Serbians began fighting for a return to the days when
Kosovar Serbs ran the country. Id. Slobodan Milosevic's assumption of the
Serbian presidency in 1987 marked the beginning of systematic aggression against
Kosovar Albanians. Id. at 6. This began with the removal of Kosovar Albanians'
participation rights in the federal government and led to egregious human rights
abuses, such as police violence, detention, torture, mass starvation, and
disappearances. Id. at 6-7. Although the Kosovar Albanians initially instituted a
program of passive resistance, their resistance turned to violence after the
international community ignored their plight during the Dayton Accords. See
WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, Kosovo: AN UNFINISHED PEACE 22 (Int'l Peace Acad.
Occasional Paper Series 2002) (noting that after the Bosnian Serbs received partial
territorial recognition at the Dayton Accords, some Albanians concluded that
perhaps violence does pay). The conflict continued until the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 1244, effectively taking control of Kosovo out of the hands of
the Serbs and establishing a U.N. protectorate. Id. at 29-31.
129. See Gregory H. Fox, Election Monitoring: The InternationalLegal Setting,
19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295, 303 (2001) (stating that "international law has taken a
significant leap forward in positing a link between democratization and effective
implementation of norms").
130. See Questions of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
GAOR, 53d Sess., Annex II, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/53/951 (1999) (detailing the U.N.
Secretary-General's role as the primary facilitator of the East Timor ballot).
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Consultation of the East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot, which
laid out the plebiscite's framework and structure.' 3
The international community, however, routinely expresses
concern regarding the "winner take all" nature of plebiscites.' 3 2 The
concern is that plebiscites result in further violence rather than in a
solution. 13 3 While scholars view a plebiscite as "the most democratic
interpretation of the concept of self-determination," it does not itself
embody democracy. 3 4 The problem is that plebiscites occur only
"'
once. 35
In democracies, the political majority and minority
populations routinely shift, thereby ensuring that the minority does
not always lose. 3 6 In a plebiscite, however, there is usually only a
single vote held, and the determination of the winner occurs before
the vote due to the existence of a large majority.'37 Rather than using
a plebiscite to make a final determination on the future of a region,
some scholars argue that the plebiscite should elect representatives to

131. See id. (providing the exact questions to be put before the voters on the
ballot, the date of the vote, and security arrangements).
132. See Competing Claims: Self-Determination, Security and the United
Nations, (Nov. 29-Dec. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Competing Claims] (recalling
statements by individuals participating in the project, "Self-Determination,
Security and the United Nations," regarding the "winner take all" outcome of
plebiscites),
at
http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublRepoReseCompCla
ims.body.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003).
133. See id. (noting concerns expressed at the project conference, including
violence occurring before or after plebiscites).
134. See Rudrakumaran, supra note 4, at 34 (discussing various theoretical
properties of plebiscites).
135. See id. (noting that because no future possibility exists for the minority to
become the majority, with plebiscites, the minority lacks adequate access to
address its grievances).
136. See id. (examining how new ruling majorities arise as a result of periodic
elections).
137. See id. (arguing that a plebiscite is not necessarily a democratic method of
self-determination). The plebiscite denies the minority democracy, in that there is
no ability to exercise influence in the form of compromises or coalitions. Id. at 35.
Not only is the minority going to lose the initial plebiscite, but also the plebiscite
will "deprive future generations of democratic rights and confer extraordinary
rights on the present population in that the latter decides for the former." Id.
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a type of "constitutional congress" that would then meet to determine
and agree upon integration, accession, or secession.'I"
The use of a plebiscite can be successful, but the parties must
carefully construct the framework agreement that acts as plebiscite
guidelines. 3 9 The East Timor plebiscite provides a good model for
14
the basic requirements of a secure U.N.-monitored plebiscite.
These requirements include: (1) unqualified consent of all the
parties; (2) a detailed layout of all aspects of the plebiscite and
monitoring efforts; (3) international support; and (4) adequate
security arrangements.' 4' All interested142parties should establish these
details through negotiated agreements.
The plebiscite in East Timor evidences both the positives and
possible negatives to the use of a plebiscite. 4 3 On the positive side,
138. See Competing Claims, supra note 132 ("Possible alternatives include
processes in which voters choose delegates to constitution-making assemblies, in
which the details of living together can be carefully negotiated.").
139. See Jennifer Toole, A False Sense of Security: Lessons Learnedfrom the
United Nations Organizationand Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 199, 251-65 (2000) (discussing the faulty provisions in the agreement
providing for the plebiscite in East Timor).
140. See id. (providing an overview of the basic requirements of a secure
international plebiscite in the context of East Timor). Some scholars argued that
the role the United Nations played in East Timor failed and that IGOs are in better
positions to fulfill such a role. Id. at 251. The comment addresses the security
failures that occurred in the East Timor plebiscite. Id. at 249. The author argues
that, despite these failures, the United Nations is likely the best agency to
undertake these endeavors. Id. at 253-54; see also BEIGBEDER, supra note 52, at
272-73 (noting the potential bias of NGOs as well as their potential inability to
independently fund international elections). But cf Amley, supra note 111, at 238
(addressing the inability of the United Nations to easily modify a mediating
proposal after their enactment).
141. See Toole, supra note 139, at 251-55 (proposing that, in taking into account
the mistakes in East Timor, there are specific steps that future plebiscites should
take).
142. See id. at 255 (stressing the requirement that all parties involved negotiate
the details of the plebiscite agreement).
143. See Craig Skehan, Alatas Gives Vote Seal of Approval, THE AGE
(Melbourne), Sept. 1, 1999, at 13 (confirming that Indonesia's Foreign Minister,
Ali Alatas, endorsed the referendum and its outcome as a success). Foreign
Minister Alatas proclaimed the referendum's success. Id. The numbers of voters,
along with their enthusiasm and lack of intimidation, were symbolic of a
successful referendum. Id.
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the referendum provided the people with a free choice between two
alternatives.'44 They could form a special autonomous region45 under
the rule of Indonesia or they could form an independent state.
Unfortunately, East Timor is also a good example of possible
plebiscite downfalls that can occur when the parties do not carefully
lay out the details in the agreement. 146 The May Fifth Agreement
between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on
the Question of East Timor detailed the forthcoming plebiscite, but
there was no consultation of the East Timorese leaders.' 47 If there had
been consultation of these leaders, the East Timorese might have
objected to giving Indonesia control over security.'48 This mistake
49
cost hundreds of East Timorese people their lives.1

144. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Governments of
Indonesia and Portugal Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation
Through a Direct Ballot, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., Annex II, at 24, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/513 (1999) [hereinafter East Timor Modalities] (affirming the existence of
two choices for the referendum).
145. See id. (proposing the following questions: "Do you accept the proposed
special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of
Indonesia?" or "Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor,
leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?"). The people of East Timor
chose independence. See Minh T. Vo, For UN and East Timor, A Chance to Start
Over, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 15, 1999, at 7 (proclaiming that the East
Timorese people "overwhelmingly" decided on independence).
146. See Toole, supra note 139, at 241-45 (discussing the "fatal flaws" of the
East Timor agreement).
147. East Timor was not a signatory to any of the main instruments addressing
its future status. See Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question
of East Timor, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., Annex I, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1999/513
(1999); East Timor Modalities, supra note 144; Agreement Between the United
Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal Regarding Security
Arrangements, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., Annex III, at 29, U.N. Doc S/1999/513
(1999).
148. See Toole, supra note 139, at 216 (describing the campaign of violence and
intimidation launched against the East Timorese people after the vote); see also
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights
Situation in East Timor, U.N. ESCOR, 4th Special Sess., paras. 14-46, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/S-4/CRP. I (1999) (detailing the human rights abuses by the Indonesian
militia including wanton killings, forced displacement, rape, involuntary
disappearances, and destruction of property).
149. See Toole, supra note 139, at 245-46 (specifying the consequences that
followed the East Timorese plebiscite).
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2. PossibleLegal Applicationfor Kashmir
The facts present in the Kashmir conflict closely mirror those in
East Timor prior to the United Nations approval of the East Timor
plebiscite as a means to ensure the legal right to selfThus, there is little doubt whether a plebiscite
determination.'
would be a suitable legal option to secure self-determination in
Kashmir. 5 ' The United Nations Security Council determined in 1948
that a plebiscite was the appropriate legal manner by which to decide
the future of Kashmir.'
Since 1948, scholars have echoed the
legality of this solution for Kashmir." 3 Although India argues that
the 1949 U.N. plebiscite order became moot after the Simla
Agreement, popular consultation of the people through a plebiscite is
54
inherent in the definition of self-determination.
A long-standing obstacle of the promised plebiscite for Kashmir is
the requirement of total demilitarization before any vote can take
' As witnessed in East Timor, the parties may need to work
place. "55
with the inability to demilitarize and alternatively use an
international electoral monitoring force to ensure a free and fair
plebiscite for Kashmir. 5 6 The parties should consider the possibility
150. See Amardeep Singh, The Right of Self-Determination: Is East Timor a
Viable Model for Kashmir?, 8 No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, at 11-12 (noting that the

uncertain legal status, U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite,
and egregious human rights violations are common to both the Kashmir and East
Timor conflicts).
151. See infra notes 152-154 and accompanying text (noting the clear legality of
a plebiscite for Kashmir).
152. See S.C. Res. 726, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., at B.6-B. 11, U.N. Doc. S/726
(1948) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 726] (calling for a free and fair plebiscite on the
question of whether Kashmir should accede to Pakistan or to India). S.C. Res. 726
did not provide for the option of Kashmiri independence. Id.
153. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 52, at 129 ("Under the principle of selfdetermination, the fate of Kashmir should be decided by its people .... ").
154. See id. (explaining that regardless of India's opinion, a plebiscite is still a
viable legal option for Kashmir).
155. See Khan, supra note 29, at 514-15 (recognizing the ongoing problem of
the demilitarization requirement). India fears that giving in to separatists in
Kashmir would lead to similar demands from separatists in Punjab and other parts
of India. Id.
156. See Toole, supra note 139, at 220-31 (discussing the different forms of
electoral assistance that the United Nations may undertake depending on the
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that a military presence along each side of the border is important to
the resolution of the dispute. 157 Otherwise, the Indian government
may effortlessly ignore the violence and price of the war that initially
58
led to their support for peace.
1 59
Legal constraints exist with any U.N. electoral monitoring.
While in some cases the United Nations may intervene without the
parent country's consent, the U.N. Charter and the 1996 Resolution
on the Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Noninterference in the International Affairs of States in their Electoral
Process emphasizes the need for a formal written request of electoral
assistance. 16° Although India may eventually agree to a plebiscite,
Kashmir likely falls within the sphere of conflicts where formal
request is not legally necessary.' 6
The primary obstacle to the use of a plebiscite is the ability to
negotiate an agreement regarding the choices the plebiscite would

requirements of the situation). The most comprehensive form designates the
United Nations as the election administrator with the power to organize the entire
election and ensuring security. Id. at 228-29.
157. See ROBERT G. WIRSING, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE KASHMIR DISPUTE ON
227 (1994) ("Immediate
ITS
RESOLUTION
CONFLICT AND
REGIONAL
demilitarization of the LOC [Line of Control], when settlement itself is postponed
to a future date, may put the military cart before the political horse.")
158. See id. (making the logical connection that force may sometimes ensure
compliance).
159. See Toole, supra note 139, at 232-33 (noting that the United Nations must
respect the domestic jurisdiction of a state before interfering in the electoral
process).
160. See id. (detailing the self-imposed legal constraints on U.N. intervention);
see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7 (articulating that the United Nations does
not have the authorization to interfere in issues that are essentially domestic in
nature). The United Nations can still take peace enforcement action through its
Chapter VII powers. Id. Chapter VII provides the U.N. Security Council with the
power to address threats to peace. Id. art. 39.
161. See Toole, supra note 139, at 233 (explaining that there are two basic
exceptions to the consent requirement). "The U.N. may choose to intervene
without consent for external self-determination elections or as part of a peace
enforcement mission." Id. If the Security Council determines under its Chapter VII
powers that intervention in Kashmir is necessary, it may intervene without consent.
See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39 (vesting power in the Security Council to intervene
where it finds a threat to international peace).
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offer. 6 2 Any agreement would have to involve assent by the
Kashmiri people and Indian and Pakistani representatives. 6 3 The
main problem with the need for an agreement is that the parties have
never been able to agree to the options for a plebiscite." 4 It is
important to note, however, that the parties to the East Timor dispute
were not able to reach any agreement until General Suharto stepped
down from power in Indonesia.'65 Change of power in Kashmir may
bring such a similar, swift solution.'66
B. EARNED SOVEREIGNTY OR CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE

1. The Lessons Learnedfrom Kosovo
In Kosovo,
sovereignty. 67
employed the
Constitutional
"Framework").

162. See

several organizations advanced the idea of earned
In the end, the lawyers at the Rambouillet Accords
new theory, which was then incorporated into the
Framework for Provisional Self-Government (the
68 The International Crisis Group ("ICG"), the

SUMIT GANGULY, THE CRISIS IN KASHMIR: PORTENTS OF WAR, HOPES

OF PEACE 142-43 (1997) (noting that the different parties to the conflict have
different opinions on the possible options a plebiscite may present).
163. See WIRSING, supra note 157, at 231 (outlining the fact that each of the
parties has significant interests and opinions in the conflict).
164. See id. (highlighting the fact that India refuses to consider a plebiscite and
Pakistan refuses to consider independence for Kashmir as an option).
165. See Smith, supra note 127 (stating that resolution of the East Timor conflict
could not occur until after Suharto left power). Suharto's successor, BJ Habibie,
was open to political compromise, including the notion of East Timor's
independence. Id.
166. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing changes
occurring in Kashmir since the elections in October 2002).
167. See A Kosovo ROADMAP, supra note 21, at 17-21 (presenting the
International Crisis Group's proposal for Kosovo's final status); see also THE
Kosovo REPORT, supra note 107, at 271-79 (providing an additional proposal for
utilizing earned sovereignty in Kosovo).
168. See Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, U.N.
Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (2001), at
Preamble [hereinafter Framework] (calling for the gradual transfer of sovereign
rights to the Kosovo people after the Provision Institutions of Self-Government
meet the necessary conditions for a peaceful life in Kosovo), available at
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Independent International Commission on Kosovo ("Kosovo
Commission"), and the Public International Law and Policy Group
("PILPG") all provided specific plans for the application of earned
sovereignty to Kosovo. 169 In fact, the ICG argued that, "[in Kosovo]
[c]onditional independence is the only solution that meets all the key

criteria for ensuring internal and regional stability simultaneously." 7 '
Additionally, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the
United Nations initially proposed the use of conditional
independence as a legally viable solution to end the Israel/Palestine
17
conflict."

There are numerous benefits to using earned sovereignty as an
In
accepted legal outcome to self-determination struggles.'
accordance with the U.N. Charter requirements regarding the
peaceful settlement of disputes without endangering justice, peace, or
security, earned sovereignty has the ability to resolve conflicts
without resorting to the extremes of independence or secession. 7 3

http//www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/regO9-Ol.htm (last visited Aug. 31,
2003).
169. See A Kosovo ROADMAP, supra note 21, at 17-21 (presenting the ICG
proposal for Kosovo's final status); see also THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 107,
at 271-79 (outlining the Kosovo Commission plan for conditional independence).
170. A KosovoROADMAP, supra note 21, at 13.
171. See Middle East Quartet, Joint Statement, Sept. 17, 2002 (detailing the
three-phased approach to granting statehood to Palestine), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rt/15207.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2003). The plan
conditions Palestinian statehood on the ability of Palestine to cease all terrorist
activities against Israel, Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian areas, the drafting of a
Palestinian Constitution, and further efforts regarding internal Palestinian reforms.
Id.
172. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 73 (declaring the importance of ensuring cultural
respect, just treatment, and self-governance for Non-Self-Governing Territories
("NSG")). Although the international community has not yet named Kashmir a
NSG, one could classify it as either a non-self-governing territory or some other
legal entity requiring protection. See Singh, supra note 150, at 11 (analyzing
Kashmir's uncertain legal status); see also Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at
2) (detailing the substantive benefits of earned sovereignty).
173. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3. (outlining a principle tenet of the United
Nations); see also WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 25
(suggesting conditional independence for Kosovo, which was a self-determination
conflict).
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This methodology provides an additional option outside of the
traditional legal dispute resolution mechanisms. 174
Earned sovereignty can promote and ensure human rights,
minority rights, and the creation of valid democratic structures. 75 It
protects human and minority rights by conditioning the grant of full
sovereignty or the further grant of individual sovereign powers on
the protection of these rights.'76 Earned sovereignty also supports the
building of feasible democratic structures for popular representation
of the people.'77 In Kosovo, UNMIK conditioned independence upon
successfully providing basic democratic institutions for selfgovernment. 7 8
Conditioning sovereign powers on specific requirements also
forces responsibility on the people.'79 If the people are unwilling to
work to protect human and minority rights, as well as to create viable
174. See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 107, at 263-79 (analyzing five
possible methods to bring peace and stability to Kosovo). These methods included:
the establishment of a protectorate, full independence, partition, autonomy with a
state, and conditional independence. Id. The Kosovo Commission determined that
conditional independence provided the best alternative solution. Id. at 271-79.
175. See Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at 2) (explaining that by creating
certain criteria to serve as conditions for independence, earned sovereignty can
better protect minority rights and democratization).
176. See id. (manuscript at 11) (noting the 1998 proposal to condition the
exercise of sovereign rights by Kosovo on the guarantee of protection to minorities
in Kosovo).
177. See BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at 9-10 (demonstrating the
importance of creating democratic institutions). The U.N. General Assembly holds
that where the government does not adequately represent the people, the people are
entitled to exercise the right to self-determination. Id. at 10; see also G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) (providing the
text of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United
Nations),
available
at
http://www.dal.ca/-wwwlaw/kindred.intllaw/friendlyrelations.htm
(last visited
Sept. 7, 2003).
178. See UNMIK/PR/792, supra note 118, sec. VII (confirming that further
devolution of powers to Kosovo depends on the ability of Kosovar citizens to meet
the conditions set out by UNMIK).

179. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 25 (observing
that if the international community retained total control over Kosovo, the
Kosovars would have no incentive to act responsibly towards their international
neighbors).
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governing structures, their state will not gain further sovereign
powers. 80 Thus, the people must constantly reaffirm their support for
the initiatives through action.' 8 ' The constant affirmation is vitally
important in sub-states with a history of fighting for self82
determination.
There are two main arguments against the use of earned
sovereignty.' 83 Earned sovereignty requires immediate discussions
regarding the powers the sub-state will initially hold, the speed with
which specified powers would devolve, and the determination of
final status.'84 In the context of Kosovo, however, scholars argued
that immediate discussions on Kosovo's status would affect Serbia
and potentially create an opportunity for reigniting violence.' 85
Officials in Serbia argued that such immediate discussions would
undermine the progress of Serbian democracy by diverting attention
away from democracy to Kosovo's status. 8 6 The Kosovo
Commission rebutted this argument by observing that the longer the
plan put off discussions on Kosovo's final status after the initial

180. See id. at 28 (arguing that Kosovo should achieve sovereignty and
independence if it maintains neighboring territorial integrity, protects human
rights, and preserves the cultures of its minorities).
181. See id. at 26-27 (noting that Kosovar institutions are responsible to ensure
the required protections of minority rights).
182. See Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (claiming that the
responsibility inherent in earned sovereignty is essential in these types of
conflicts).
183. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 28-31
(addressing the three main arguments the Kosovo Commission anticipated from
critics of conditional independence). The third argument concerns the ability to get
the proposal past Russia's U.N. Security Council veto. Id.
184. See id. at 28 (countering the first argument against the use of conditional
independence inKosovo).
185. 'See id. at 29-31 (discussing the main arguments advanced against the use of
conditional independence in Kosovo); see also Williams, supra note 109
(manuscript at 35) (reviewing the Kosovo Commission's posture on the arguments
against earned sovereignty).

186. See

WHY CONDITIONAL

INDEPENDENCE?,

supra note 110, at 28-29

(acknowledging the possible problems that could arise in Serbia during talks of
Kosovo's future status).
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Security Council resolution, the. more difficult it would be to raise
support for the discussions in the future.'87
The second major argument against the use of earned sovereignty
in Kosovo was the domino theory.'88 Scholars and states worried that
allowing conditional independence for Kosovo would induce a fight
for similar results in Montenegro. 8 9 The Kosovo Commission
maintained, however, that conditional independence in Kosovo
would not give rise to the domino theory, arguing that earned
sovereignty is a legal rule that simply is not applicable to every fact
situation. 90 It is similar to arguing that one legal rule applies to every
factual situation, a scenario that has never been the case. 9 ' Each new
factual situation requires a unique and nuanced application of the
general rule. 192 In addition, while slippery slopes exist in domestic
law and are a genuine concern, international legal history does not
show that grants of sovereignty immediately lead to a watershed of
that would not also
claims. 93 Finally, there is no other legal option
94
occur.
to
were
lead to a domino effect- if one

187. See Martin Woollacott, There is a Dangerous Lack of Clarity on Kosovo's
Future: The International Community Does Have Other Responsibilities, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 9, 2001, at 18 (confirming that Kosovo will begin to
"fester" if movement is not made on the issue of its status).
188. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 30 (stating that
the second argument against conditional independence is the domino theory).
189. See id. (discussing the possibilities that other regions, such as Montenegro
or Vojvidina in Serbia, may pursue a similar remedy).
190. See id. at 30 (responding to the domino theory argument and maintaining
that other states cannot necessarily make the same legal claims of systematic abuse
of human rights that existed in Kosovo).
191. See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY,

AND

STYLE 186 (4th ed. 2001) (affirming that different

factual situations can lead a court to different decisions).
192. See Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (discussing the possible
domino effect created by granting earned sovereignty powers).
193. See id. (responding that after the proposal made for Kosovo at Rambouillet,
there was no watershed effect).
194. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 30 (stating that
"it is difficult to see why any of the alternative options proposed are less likely to
generate domino-type consequences for Kosovo's neighbours").
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Another important drawback to earned sovereignty is its cost. 95
Financing self-determination solutions, however, is not a problem
unique to earned sovereignty.' 96 The tenets of earned sovereignty
allow for the protection of basic human and minority rights, but
neutral parties must monitor the success of these conditions. 97 In
addition, earned sovereignty usually requires an ongoing
international presence or monitoring unit.' 98 When groups consider
earned sovereignty as a possible solution, provisions for international
monitoring aid, as well as bilateral aid, must accompany it. 99
Kosovo also evinced a major complication with earned
sovereignty's core concept of granting specific levels of
sovereignty. 0 0 The Framework set up by a Special Representative to
the U.N. Secretary General ("SRSG") distributed initial sovereign
powers to Kosovo while reserving specific authority to the SRSG. 0'
Although the Framework did not embody earned sovereignty as.
proposed by PILPG and the Kosovo Commission, it did apply the
essential earned sovereignty component by initially granting only
partial sovereignty. 02 This created "the illusion of self-rule rather

195. See Amley, supra note 111, at 260 (discussing the need for funds in order
to facilitate awards-based strategies).
196. See id. (confirming that the need to ensure distribution, receipt by the
proper parties, and appropriate consumption, is costly).
197. See Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at 11) (noting the need for
monitoring missions in order to ensure the protection of minority rights in
Kosovo).
198. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 27 (outlining
the requirement of an international monitoring and security presence to oversee the
implementation of conditions placed on Kosovo).
199. See id. (noting that monitoring aid requires the presence of international
assistance to ensure the protection of borders and minorities).
200. See id. at 25 (explaining that the Framework's partial grant of sovereignty
left the Kosovars with few more powers than those of a colony).
201. See Framework, supra note 168, at chs. 5 & 8 (detailing in Chapters 5 and
8 the responsibilities of the Kosovar government and the powers reserved to the
SRSG).
202. See WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 20 (explaining
the plan set out by the Framework for a partial grant of sovereignty to Kosovo).
See generally Framework, supra note 168, at chs. 5 & 8 (noting the ove.rall plan
built into the Framework).
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than the reality.

'2 3

The Kosovo Commission expressed concerns that

this type of plan would lead to conflict not between the warring
parties, but between the Kosovar citizens and the international
monitoring group."' The Kosovo Commission also argued that the
powers reserved by the SRSG were not conducive to the promotion
of Kosovo and its people, which in turn was not conducive to earned
sovereignty. 0 5 One could solve the problems with devolved
sovereignty-in Kosovo by adopting a rapid devolution of sovereign
power with limits imposed by specific conditions agreed upon by the
involved parties.206 Thus, the Commission proposed that the only
way to get a new state to act responsibly is to give it responsibility.20 7
Finally, any agreement using earned sovereignty as a legal concept
should clearly define each condition or obligation. 08 Without
specific definitions, it is too easy for the agreement to cause further
conflict in the future. 209 "Rather than providing criteria for evaluating
performance by each side, each benchmark will itself become a focal

203. WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE?, supra note 110, at 20. While the
government of Kosovo had authority over the judiciary, economy, local
administration, and the media, the SRSG still had, for example, the power to
dissolve the assembly, remove judges, and to oversee all external relations. Id.
204. See id. at 21 (expressing concern that once Kosovo gets a taste of self-rule,
the local politicians will rely on its power of approval by the electorate to fight for
further sovereign powers and less interference by the international community).
205. See id. at 25 (pointing out that UNMIK's plan for Kosovo succeeds in
creating a colonial dependency rather than a self-governing state). The
Commission saw "no convincing reason" why the Kosovars themselves should not
have control over the range of powers reserved to the SRSG. Id.
206. See id. at 25-26 (proposing a solution to the problem created by the
reservations of power by the SRSG).
207. See id. at 20-21 (pointing out that awarding a sub-state too little power will
likely lead to distrust and conflict between the sub-state and the monitoring
commission).
208. See Dennis Ross, Editorial, Mapping Out Peace in the Mideast: 'Quartet'
Needs to Alter Plan to Move from Conflict to Bush's Solution, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
20, 2002, at 2 (outlining problems with the lack of clearly defined obligations in
the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan proposed by the United States, the European
Union, Russia, and the United Nations).
209. See id. (describing the possible problems that could arise if the agreement
is not stated specifically).
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point for debate-and that will lead to one more dead-end in
peacemaking. 2 °
2. PossibleLegal Applicationfor Kashmir
The U.N. Charter proclaims that its central purpose is to
strengthen international peace and security while promoting
principles of self-determination.2 ' Traditionally only territories
subject to colonial, alien, or racist domination had the legal right to
independence. 212 The legal community restricted independence to
these specific situations in an attempt to retain territorial integrity.2"3
Furthermore, international law principally rejects any general right to
state secession."' Recently, however, the international legal
community began to support the right of "remedial secession. '215 The

210. Id.
211. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (emphasizing the purpose of the United Nations
as an international peacekeeping organization).
212. See Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 11) (explaining the traditional
terms for a grant of independence). The international community also required that
the new state respect the principle of uti possidetis, which limits the boundaries of
the emerging state to its colonial boundaries. Id.
213. See Huang, supra note 83, at 185 (noting the denial of self-determination
claims by groups after the end of the Cold War on the premise of preserving
sovereignty and territorial integrity in international law); see also Graham, supra
note 97, at 465 ("[T]he defining issue in international law for the 21st century is
finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity
of borders.").
214. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflections on the Right to SelfDetermination: Prospects and Problemsfor a Democratic Global Future in the
New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 151, 198-99 (1999) (discussing the
reluctance of international law theorists to even contemplate a right to secede).
. 215. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, Annex to G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, Supp.
No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles]
("Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity or sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples"); see also BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at 2
(affirming the right to secede when self-identified groups have experienced severe
human rights abuses due to an effective denial of their right to self-government).
The group must affirmatively demonstrate, however, that it meets this criterion. Id.
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Kashmir situation meets the requirements for remedial secession, and
therefore the international community may seek remedial secession
as a solution to Kashmir's claims for self-determination. 1 6 Thus,

earned sovereignty provides an ideal legal solution for Kashmir
because it recognizes Kashmir's right to self-determination and
sovereign powers without the use of secession, which would
effectively destroy India's territorial integrity.2 7

There are considerable benefits to the use of earned sovereignty in
Kashmir that may outweigh the obstacles to its use. 218 Earned
sovereignty furthers compromise by taking into consideration the
concerns of each party. 2 9 By allowing for the protection of Kashmiri
human rights, a withdrawal of leadership by the Hindu majority state,
and the ability to protect territorial integrity and secularism, earned
sovereignty effectively addresses the parties' concerns. 22° The
But see Huang, supra note 83, at 227 (arguing that the international community
should judge a group's right to self-determination on a case-by case basis). The
principle of self-determination is not an automatic right for all parties that claim it.
Id.
216. See Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 12-13) (stating that where a defined
"people" repeatedly is denied human rights and the right to democratic selfgovernment, the people have the right to remedial secession); see also supra Part
I.A and accompanying notes (describing the instances of human rights abuse and
denial of democratic processes to the Kashmiri people); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) (mandating that the will of the people should serve as the basis
of governmental authority); Fox, supra note 129, at 297-301 (discussing the
emerging right to democratic governance).
217. See supra Part 1.B.2 (outlining the fundamental principles of earned
sovereignty); see also Oloka-Onyango, supra note 214, at 199 (discussing that
international legal scholars call for less "extreme" forms of self-determination and
the need to bring secession within the constraints of international law). There is a
need for a new formulation of secession that meets the needs of self-determination,
but does not provide full secession. Id. But see Graham, supra note 97, at 465
(stressing the idea that in Kosovo, the severity of the treatment of the Kosovar
people legitimized the need to set aside concerns of territorial integrity).
218. See infra notes 219-222 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
using earned sovereignty as a legal bargaining tool in Kashmir).
219. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (explaining the process by
which the parties may negotiate the conditions and sovereign powers granted to the
sub-state).
220. See supra Part 1.B.2 (defining the guidelines for earned sovereignty and its
effects on the parties to a conflict); see also AHMAR, supra note 10, at 30
(considering some of the conditions that could be set for earned independence).
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primary objectives in resolving the Kashmiri crisis are to bring two
nuclear powers back from the brink of war, avoid secession, and
restore Kashmir to its pre-insurgence economic level. 21 The legal
give and take of earned sovereignty achieves this objective while
considering the demands of each party.222
Another significant benefit to earned sovereignty is that it grants
the sub-state the necessary legal status to gain recognition in the
international community.2 23 Over the years, there have been several
instances of states ratifying treaties and participating in international
organizations as full members without sovereign rights.224
International representation for Kashmir as a sub-state entity with
varying levels of sovereign powers, may be an essential component
to Pakistani approval of any Kashmir agreement. 2 5 Furthermore,
earned sovereignty also allows a sub-state entity to become a party to
the agreement itself.226 International law recognizes the sovereign

Some of these objectives could include (1) requiring both Pakistan and Kashmir to
control the amount of anti-India propaganda; (2) withdrawal of Indian and
Pakistani troops from the Line of Control; and (3) changing the present policies of
both India and Pakistan regarding the use of nuclear force. Id.
221. See Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 11, annex,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 51, at 22, U.N. Doe. A/39/51 (1984)
(emphasizing the right of all people to live without the threat of nuclear war); see
also supra notes 11 and 27-36 (noting the major interests of the parties).
222. See Heller & Sofaer, supra note 112, at 26-27 (listing the various
sovereignty rights and obligations that states may use to negotiate).
223. See Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4) (outlining the legal benefits of a
sovereign state).
224. See id. (manuscript at 5) (noting that India and the Philippines were
founding members of the United Nations even though they did not have formal
independence). In addition, member states of entities such as the European Union
effectively have only quasi-sovereignty because they give certain sovereign right
to the Union. Id. This does not strip these states of international legal
representation. Id.
225. See Ganguly, supra note 38, and accompanying text (explaining the
principles behind the Pakistani involvement in Kashmir).
226. See ProblematicSovereignty, supra note 98, at 5 (describing the benefits of
sovereignty and the exercise of its legal power); see also Heller & Sofaer, supra
note 112, at 27 (arguing that the right to make international agreements is
exclusive to states with sovereign powers).
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right of states to exercise sovereignty and sign on to agreements.227
The participation of Kashmir as a signatory to any agreement is
essential, and earned sovereignty grants them the legal power to sign
such an agreement.2
There are many inherent obstacles to overcome before Kashmir
could apply the concept of earned sovereignty as a legal solution.229
First, while the parties do not initially need to determine final status,
there does need to be some consideration of the extent to which
powers would devolve to Kashmir. 230 Although it is clear that

maintaining the status quo is not an option, 3 Pakistan, India, and
Kashmir all have very different opinions regarding the future status
of Kashmir. 32 While the Kashmiri representatives would likely agree
with the devolution of specific sovereign powers, the Pakistanis
believe that the central goal of the conflict is not independence, or
even heightened autonomy.233 Rather, Pakistan believes that Kashmir
should accede to Pakistan, but similarly, India maintains that

227. See Problematic Sovereignty, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that exercising
sovereignty in signing treaties enhances a state's capacity to deal with international
issues); see also Heller & Sofaer, supra note 112, at 25 (commenting that states
bind themselves in agreements through a legal exercise of their sovereign powers).
228. See Heller & Sofaer, supra note 112, at 27 (explaining that signing on to an
agreement is a legal right of sovereign states); see also Williams, supra note 109
(manuscript at 2) (listing the requirements of earned sovereignty, which includes
sharing sovereign rights).
229. See infra notes 230-242 and accompanying text (examining the problems
that may exist for application of earned sovereignty to Kashmir).
230. See Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at 2) (detailing that attainment of
certain levels of de facto and de jure sovereignty satisfies one of the five basic
elements of earned sovereignty).
231. See Rahman, supra note 51, at 163 (noting that maintaining the status quo
would necessitate the maintenance of terrorism, intimidation, ethnic violence, and
coercion).
232. See id. at 161 (explaining that India is reluctant to release Kashmir for fear
of giving up secularism and that Kashmir fights for independence); see also
WIRSING, supra note 157, at 231 (assessing the Pakistani position that
independence is not an option for Kashmir, nor is remaining with India).
233. See WIRSING, supra note 157, at 231 ("Decades of struggle with India over
Kashmir, from [Pakistan's] perspective, would have been wasted were Kashmir to
emerge independent of both India and Pakistan.").
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Kashmir is vital to their. sustained territorial integrity.23 4 Such a wide
difference of belief will affect the extent to which the parties will
allow India to devolve powers dejure to Kashmir.2 35 If there can be
no agreement that any powers will devolve, earned sovereignty will
fail.2 36

Second, earned sovereignty requires some type of outside
monitoring group. 237 The main problem is that India refuses to allow

multilateral discussions regarding Kashmir. 3 India considers
Kashmir a regional matter, and they argue that the Simla Agreement
supports such regionalism. 39 Additionally, Pakistan has such a
historical stake in Kashmir that it may refuse to entrust its interest to
international monitoring and peace negotiators.24 °
Third, there is a significant fear that special treatment of Kashmir
will lead to a domino effect for other Indian provinces, eventually
culminating in a total dissolution of the sub-continent. 24' The same
arguments against the domino effect proffered by the Kosovo

234. See id. (discussing Pakistani distaste for Kashmir's independence); see also
AHMAR, supra note 10, at 28 (examining India's present attitude towards

Kashmir).
235. See Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (confirming that the
extent to which powers can devolve is a case-by-case analysis).
236. See Williams, supra note 109 (manuscript at 2) (stating that the doctrine of
earned sovereignty relies on the ability to devolve certain levels of sovereign
authority to the sub-state).
237. See id. (naming the five basic criteria of earned sovereignty and the need
for international intervention or mediation for final status); ,see also
UNMIK/PR/792, supra note 118 (stating UNMIK's determination that Kosovo had
not yet met the required standards for status).
238. See WIRSING, supra note 157, at 223 (noting that India is unlikely to agree
to a proposal whereby Kashmir is entrusted to an international group).
239. See The Simla Agreement, supra note 49 (providing for settlement of the
conflict through regional means); see also AHMAR, supra note 10, at 35
(emphasizing that Indians reject the possibility for external help in the settlement
of the conflict).
240. See WIRSING, supra note 157, at 223 (stating that the international
community has routinely ignored Pakistan's requests for international monitoring
and therefore may cause Pakistan concern regarding protection of Pakistani
interests in future international involvement).
241. See id. at 231 (describing the effect an independent Kashmir could have on
both India and Pakistan).
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Commission and PILPG apply equally to Kashmir because (1) the
facts in Kashmir closely resemble those in Kosovo at the time of
Rambouillet, and (2) it is unlikely that any other solution would not
cause a domino effect as well.242

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.N. Security Council continually affirms that the situation in

Kashmir is an ongoing threat to international peace and security.2243
44
The threat stems from the illegal denial of self-determination.
General principles of international law impose a duty on all states to

refrain from actions that may deprive the right of self-determination
to those people deserving of it. 2 45 Thus, the actions currently pursued
by the Indian Security Forces and Pakistani paramilitary groups are
illegal by international standards.2 46 The parties must step outside the
paths of illegality presently pursued and create a compromise
completely couched in international law.147 Granting the long
promised plebiscite provides the first step towards legally resolving

242. See supra notes 188-194 (outlining the arguments against the belief that a
domino effect would occur and confirming that there is no guarantee that any
solution would not lead to a domino effect).
243. See S.C. Res. 307, U.N. SCOR, 1621st Mtg., S/RES/307 (1971) (stating
that the situation in Kashmir "remains a threat to international peace and
security.").
244. See AHMAR, supra note 10, at 31 ("The solution to the Kashmir dispute is
not entirely the need for socioeconomic and political reforms but also the right of
the Kashmiris to self-determination.").
245. See Declaration on Principles, supra note 215 (codifying the principle that
the prevention of the exercise of self-determination, freedom, and independence
through forcible action is a violation of international law). "Every State has the
duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the
elaboration of the principle of equal right and self-determination of their right to
self-determination and freedom and independence." Id.
246. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art.
6 (negating the ability of any signatory to derogate from the right to life); see also
India's Secret Army in Kashmir, supra note 18 (recognizing the international law
violations by both India and Pakistan).
247. See Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (discussing the necessity
of applying international law in Kashmir in order to move outside the present state
of violation).
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The second step requires the negotiating

parties to apply the legal concept of earned sovereignty to the factual
situation that exists in Kashmir.149 Thus, earned sovereignty should
serve as a legally accepted intermediate status, while also providing
for the devolution of many sovereign powers to Kashmir with the
understanding that Kashmir may never achieve total independence.250.
A. ENSURING THE APPROVAL OF THE PEOPLE IN KASHMIR

Although there are inherent problems with plebiscites, the
resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council legally grant a
plebiscite to the people of Kashmir.2"' There will be no long-standing
resolution of the conflict until the government of India consults the
Kashmiri people. 2 Therefore, the parties should agree to subject any
agreement for Kashmir to approval by plebiscite. 3 Not only does
this ensure the legal right of self-determination, but it also acts as the
legal approval of the agreement.254 Much like the terms of ratification
for the U.S. Constitution, the agreement would have no binding legal

248. See Kolodner, supra note 121, at 158 (explaining that Kashmir is an
example of a situation where the continued denial of the right to self-determination
leads to ongoing uncertainty).
249. Compare supra note 128 (summarizing the modem history of Kosovo),
with supra Part L.A (describing the conflict in Kashmir).
250. See generally AHMAR, supra note 10, at 30 (confirming that you must
provide a solution that addresses the root cause of the conflict). It is unreasonable
to believe that using force or controversial elections to quell uprisings will solve
the underlying cause of the violence. Id.
251. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (providing a timeline of Security
Council resolutions affirming the need for a plebiscite concerning Kashmir's
status).
252. See generally Toole, supra note 139, at 219-21 (accepting that where there
is a fight for self-determination, a free and fair vote is necessary).
253. See S.C. Res. 726, supra note 152 and accompanying text (declaring the
legal necessity of a plebiscite in Kashmir via Security Council resolutions).
254. See Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR,
53rd Sess., Annex I, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/1999/513 (1999) (reporting the Agreement
Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question
of East Timor and submitting the proposed constitutional framework for East
Timor to the people for approval), available at http://www.antenna.nl/-ipjet/unagreements.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).

20031

EARNED SO VEREIGNTY FOR KASHMIR

authority until the parties appropriately assented to the document.255
The text of the Kashmir plebiscite could closely resemble the text of
the Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the
Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor; however, there
must be a more exacting provision on the safety and security of the
Kashmiri citizens.256 Additionally, neither Pakistan nor India may
ignore the third option of independence for Kashmir.257 In order to
resolve further violence, the plebiscite must provide Kashmiri
citizens the following options: (1) accession to Pakistan; (2)
heightened autonomy through earned sovereignty in India; or (3) an
independent Kashmiri state.258
As an additional step, the negotiating parties should sponsor a
popular vote to elect representatives to a Kashmiri constitutional
congress.2 19 As stated above, the valley of Kashmir is Muslim, but
Jammu and Ladakh, although smaller than the Kashmir valley,
contain a significant number of Sikhs and Hindus, and all three
groups make up the population of Jammu and Kashmir.26 This step,
taken prior to any negotiations, ensures fair acceptance, via
plebiscite, of the final agreement embodying earned sovereignty. 6

255. See U.S. CONST., art. VII (specifying the number of states that must ratify
the Constitution prior to its effect).
256. See supra notes 139-149 and accompanying text (examining the successes

and failures of the East Timor plebiscite).
257. See S.C. Res. 726, supra note 152 (noting that the plebiscite suggested by

the U.N. Security Council did not include an option for Kashmiri independence).
258. See generally India's Secret Army in Kashmir, supra note 18 (proclaiming

that there is violence on behalf of groups that hold all three of these beliefs).
259. See Competing Claims, supra note 132 (proposing the use of plebiscites to

elect representatives of each cultural group).
260. See Srivastava, supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining the
cultural make-up of the Jammu and Kashmir region).
261. See Competing Claims, supra note 132 (attempting to avoid the problem of
majority-rule decision by involving all groups in structuring the agreement).
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B. CREATING RESPONSIBILITY AND AWARDS
The

international

community

should

recommend

earned

sovereignty as the legal solution to the Kashmir conflict.2 6 The
Kashmir crisis requires the use of a new norm, one outside the
historical legal options of sovereignty or secession. 6 3 International
legal scholars agree that solutions advocating the deconstruction or

abandonment of sovereignty are misguided and unreasonable
because real change requires the transformation of sovereignty rather
than its destruction. 264 Thus, although Kashmir may have a legal right
to international promotion of secession, other legal dispute resolution

methodologies, employing new transformations of sovereignty, will
prevent the human rights abuses in Kashmir without destroying
2 65
territorial integrity.

The people of Kashmir, as well as the government of India and
Pakistan, routinely call for opposite solutions to the conflict. 266 The
best solution is to offer awards for compromise. 267 Therefore, the
parties should initially grant specific sovereign powers to Kashmir

262. See Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (discussing appropriate
options for the resolution of Kashmir).
263. See Huang, supra note 83, at 186 (noting that where the fight for selfdetermination caused a conflict by the fight for self-determination, gross human
rights violations, and a massive loss of life, the international community attempts
to find peaceful means of resolution in order to avoid threats to international peace
and security); see also Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 19) ( "International
support for transitional independence in the form of [earned] sovereignty must be
recognized as a valid remedy when the state's actions extinguish that presumption,
thus resolving the tension between territorial integrity and self-determination.").
264. See Heller & Sofaer, supra note 112, at 26 (comparing the deconstruction
of sovereignty to the transformation of sovereignty and discussing the benefits of
transformation).
265. See Res. 15414, supra note 120 and accompanying text (affirming
importance of territorial integrity).
266. See GANGULY, supra note 162, at 131-45 (detailing the opinions of the
interested groups of the options for Kashmir).
267. See Amley, supra note 111, at 254 (confirming that using rewards to
achieve objectives is an obvious tactic for dealing with parties as long as the
parties are willing to cooperate).
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and condition the grant of further sovereign powers on the ability of
all parties to respect fundamental norms of international law.268
Furthermore, new legal concepts of sovereignty and acceptable
self-determination outcomes must attain legal sanctification or the
rule of law itself will suffer.269 As in U.S. domestic common law, and
further evidenced in customary international law, applying a legal
concept in factually appropriate situations provides the best means of
solidifying the legal concept.27 0 The precedent for the application of
earned sovereignty is constantly expanding and its use in Kashmir
would further strengthen its recognition in international law.2 7'
Sufficient factual similarity exists to legally justify extending the
application of earned sovereignty to Kashmir. 2 Kashmir, because of
its historical, religious, and geographical ties does not have access to
the typical legal solutions in a fight for self-determination secession, statehood, or total dependence.273 Earned sovereignty is
the ideal approach to Kashmir because it permits a legal solution
between total sovereignty and statehood, secession, and sub-state
status.274
268. See BALKANS REPORT No. 46, supra note 14, at I (proposing a similar
solution to the conflict in Kosovo).
269. See Heller & Sofaer, supra note 112, at 39 (positing that when groups such
as the International Court of Justice and individual scholars claim the existence of
a legal norm when the norm does not exist, the reputation of international law
suffers).
270. See Graham, supra note 97, at 457 ("[T]he evolution of self-determination
as a legal construct is continuously shaped by the realities of practice.").
271. See A Kosovo ROADMAP, supra note 21 (presenting the ICG proposal for
Kosovo's final status); see also THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 107, at 271-73
(outlining the Kosovo Commission's plan for conditional independence); Middle
East Quartet, supra note 171 (detailing a joint statement from the European Union,
the United Nations, and Russia in outlining the three-phased approach to granting
statehood to Palestine); Scharf, supra note 2 (manuscript at 19) (confirming that,
"[T]he time has come to embrace dejure the new reality of [phased] sovereignty
that is emerging from diplomatic practice.") (emphasis added).
272. Compare Part L.A (providing the history of the Kashmir conflict), with
supra note 128 (outlining the background behind the conflict in Kosovo).
273. See WIRSING, supra note 157, at 259 (arguing that the correct solution for
Kashmir did not exist).
274. See Huang, supra note 83, at 187 (claiming that non-colonial fights for selfdetermination may include state incorporation, heightened autonomy, freedom
within the federation, or total independence).
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CONCLUSION
Until recently, a legal solution for Kashmir did not exist.27 5 The
evolution of the term sovereignty away from the stringent notions of
independence and secession into the legally accepted intermediate
status of earned sovereignty creates a viable resolution.276
Negotiating an agreement based upon the idea of earned sovereignty
allows India to retain its territorial integrity, permits Pakistan to gain
important ground in separating Kashmir from India without granting
total independence to Kashmir or allowing accession to Pakistan, and
provides the Kashmiri people with important international
recognition and sovereign rights.2 77 The approval of an agreement
couched in earned sovereignty via plebiscite presents Kashmir with
its long awaited and long promised plebiscite. 7 s Kashmir is a perfect
example of the fact that resolution of future ethnic conflicts will
come only with continued scholarly discourse and legal codification
of conflict resolution options such as earned sovereignty. 79

275. See WIRSING, supra note 157, at 259 (claiming that a "right" solution for
Kashmir did not exist).
276. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (detailing the stringent

notion of sovereignty and the evolving idea of sovereignty as a set of rights).
277. See supra notes 218-222 (outlining the possible outcomes that earned

sovereignty enables).
278. See supra notes 151-158 (recognizing Kashmir's legal right to a plebiscite);
see also Part L.A (outlining the history of the Kashmir conflict and the numerous

promises of a plebiscite).
279. See Interview with Paul Williams, supra note 103 (examining the need for
continued discourse on solutions to sovereignty based conflicts).

